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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
(damage by water). These cases indicate the unwillingness of the courts
to discharge an insurance company from liability on a policy merely be-
cause the goods were destroyed by the attempts at salvage and not by
the fire itself. Yet, such a discharge would be the logical result of the
holding in the principal case, for such attempts make it impossible to prove
what would have been the loss from the fire itself.
But even assuming that his was an ordinary contract of suretyship, and
admitting that every surety on paying the creditor-the Society-has an
absolute right of subrogation to the creditor's position [United States v.
National Surety Co. (1920) 254 U. S. 73] and that any action of the
creditor which changes materially the surety's risk or impairs this right
of subrogation discharges the surety [State v. MeGonigle (1890) 101 Mo.
353, 13 S. W. 758; Cummings v. Little (1869) 45 Mo. 183], still it is clear
that the rules governing discharge of a surety by material alteration are
inapplicable. An alteration affecting the surety's risk must occur before
the breach of the principal contract. Here, the breach occurred and the
loss for which the defendant was liable was entailed before the so-called
material alteration. Thus the arrangement could have had no effect in
increasing the surety's risk, since the risk became fixed as of the time of
the breach of trust by the treasurer. But the question still remains was
the right of subrogation impaired? The Court properly said that the
surety on payment of the loss would have been subrogated to any rights
that the Society had against the People's Bank and would have been en-
titled to step in and claim its pro rata share of the assets had the Bank
been liquidated. But, said the Court, the Bank was dissolved and its
assets transferred with the consent of the Society, thus eliminating any
assets to which the surety company might look for reimbursement and
making it impossible to determine the value of the rights to which it
would have been subrogated. Does this necessarily follow? Was it not
possible to determine with a fair degree of accuracy just what were the
assets and liabilities of the Bank at the time the Trust Company took it
over, thereby ascertaining what would have been the amount for which the
surety would have been liable had the Bank been liquidated? It would
then be apparent whether this amount would have been greater or less than
$41,000. It does not seem reasonable to believe that a bank must be liqui-
dated before it can be discovered what its assets and liabilities are. In
this respect the decision seems to be unfair in penalizing the Society for
acting with reasonable prudence under the circumstances in an attempt at
salvage, especially since state authorities estimated that the loss would
have been much greater had the Bank been liquidated. D. P., '33.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-CONSENT TO ABORTION AS BAR TO REcovERY.-The
court, in Martin v. Morris (Tenn. 1931) 42 S. W. (2d) 207, held as a mat-
ter of law that a woman who consents to an operation to produce an abor-
tion cannot recover damages from the physician for injuries resulting
from that operation.
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
This decision raises for the first time in five years the efficacy of consent
as a defense in a civil action for damages where the cause rests upon the
commission of a crime by which the public peace or the life of an indi-
vidual or his person is affected. 1 Cooley, TORTS (3rd ed. 1906) 282.
The most recent case prior to the principal one is Szadiwicz V. Cantor
(1926) 257 Mass. 518, 154 N. E. 251, which held in accord with the instant
case, and strengthened a position, which hitherto had been in the minority,
refusing recovery on the strict doctrine that a court will not lend its aid to
one who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act to which
he has consented. This view is favored in Throckmorton's, Cooley on Torts
(1930) 240, as consonant not only with the general principle of volenti non
fit iniuria, but with common sense justice.
The contrary doctrine and probably the majority rule is asserted in
Milliken v. Heddesheimer (1924) 110 Ohio St. 381, 144 N. E. 610; Lembo v.
Donnell (1917) 116 Me. 505, 101 Atl. 469; Miller v. Boyer (1896) 94 Wis.
123, 68 N. W. 869. The rule which denies the ability to consent to an as-
sault and battery accompanied by a breach of the peace is extended by
these cases to include abortions, as affecting a public interest in the life
and safety of individuals, which forbids the power to consent. This pub-
lic interest is evidently of a different nature from that sought to be pro-
tected by the criminal law. The Missouri statutes are directed solely at
the physician and make him guilty of manslaughter if the operation is fatal
to the mother of an unborn "quick" child, and if the operation is successful,
he is guilty of a felony. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 3990, 3991. Performing
any criminal abortion is a ground for revocation of the surgeon's license
to practice. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 9120.
In many jurisdictions, as in Missouri, the question as to civil liability has
never arisen. The trend of the last twenty years is with the minority rule,
upholding consent as a defense. This position was adopted by the Ameri-
can Law Institute in its RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS (Am. L. Inst.
1925) no. 1 sec. 75.
Where, however, there is negligence resulting in injuries which are be-
yond the normal consequences of the illegal operation, there is no apparent
reason why the physician should not be held liable as in every other case of
malpractice. Such negligence overreaches the scope of .consent and ex-
pectancy. If it is recognized that such operations will inevitably be per-
formed, a liability for negligence would seem desirable as an additional
protective measure tending at least to induce care. S. M. R., '33.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY ARISING "OUT OF" AND "IN COURSE
OF EMPLOYMENT."--Plaintiff whose duty it was to see that lights were
burning on defendant's trucks parked on a street adjacent to defendant's
premises was injured while crossing a street other than the one on which
the trucks were parked. Held, that the injury of plaintiff did not arise
out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment so as to permit recovery
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